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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such,methods. 
Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 8. Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works .in the field. 
12 October 1981  
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B. Schwarz, K. C. Bowen, Istvhn Kiss and Edward S. Quade 
Previous chapters have presented a simplified description of the systems 
analysis approach (Chapter 4), and then treated in more detail formulating the 
problem (Chapter 5 ) ,  identifying objectives and constraints and designing and 
improving alternatives (Chapter 6), and, finally, model building and using models 
to predict the consequences ensuing from each alternative (Chapter 7). This 
chapter deals with the guidance an analyst can provide, based on the informa- 
tion he has produced regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
alternatives, to those responsible for selecting an  action. This selection can 
sometimes be uncomplicated, but more often, when there are competing objec- 
tives, multiple decisionmakers, or great uncertainty about future conditions, it 
becomes a complex social process in which conflicts tend to be resolved by bar- 
gaining, and political pressures may overpower research findings. The way the 
results are presented and the information and. evidence presented with them 
can both facilitate and improve the choice. 
An analyst can almost never, based on h s  analysis alone, tell the decision- 
maker with confidence: "This alternative should be selected." His mathematical 
model may designate an optimum action, but it is an optimum only in the 
domain of the model, for even the most perfect of models corresponds only 
imperfectly to the real world. Optimization is a technical concept, inapplicable 
in situations where differing values, uncertainty, ambiguity, multidimensional- 
ity, and qualitative judgment are present and possibly dominant. Even with per- 
fect information, the most that can be done is to find the alternative that best 
satisfies a certain criterion under a given set of assumptions. This is far from 
full optimization, whch would require considering simultaneously the complete 
set  of consequences for every choice of alternative, taking into account the full 
range of future events and their associated probabilities. 
For multiple decisionmakers, there can, in fact, be no optimality; any such 
concept depends on a particular decisionmaker's values, purposes, abilities, and 
needs. Consequently, as Boothroyd (1978) puts it, "...would-be-scientific inter- 
vention is a t  best a way of getting things righter, not of getting them right." Ear- 
lier, citing other reasons, Charles Hitch (1960b) had laid the ghost of optimiza- 
tion to rest in his retiring address as President of the Operations Research 
Society of America: "...Most of our relations are so unpredictable that we do well 
to get the right sign and order of magnitude of first differentials. In most of our 
attempted optimizations we are kidding our customers or ourselves or both. If 
we can show our customer how to make a better decision than he would other- 
wise have made, we are doing well, and all that can reasonably be expected of 
us." 
Thus, in systems analysis, whenever the terms optimum, optimal, and 
optimization are found, they must be interpreted with great caution, for they 
refer to something that is, a t  best, a suboptimization. 
The goal of the analyst may, in fact, be to do better than to produce, by 
cost-benefit or other criteria selected by the decisionmaker, the correct rank- 
ing of the limited set of alternatives he has examined so that a "best" can be 
selected from among them. To t h s  end he must, of necessity, learn a great deal 
about the subject of inquiry; but nevertheless he may remain far from having 
the expertise of the client and his staff. Thus, he may instead, as Goeller (1972, 
1977, and section 3.4) and Holling and his colleagues (1978) do, as discussed in 
section 8.8, seek a presentation that will enable the decisionmaker to under- 
stand the strengths and weaknesses of-and the tradeoffs among-the various 
alternatives, so that a new and better alternative can be generated before action 
is taken. 
2. CRITERIA 
A criterion is a rule or standard by which the analyst can rank alternatives 
for the decisionrnaker. The alternative ranked first indicates the alternative 
among those ranked that is best or is most consistent with the decisionmaker's 
objectives according to this standard. 
As an example, suppose a decisionmaker's objective were to provide elec- 
tric power for his constituents by building a dam on a certain stretch of river. 
Assume he has a budget of 200 million dollars available for the project. A cri- 
terion for ranking the various dams that might be built in different designs and 
locations along the river could be to rank the ones that can be constructed for 
the available budget in decreasing order of power output. Although the purpose 
of a criterion is distinct from that of an objective, the decisionmaker could state 
h s  objective in exactly the same words, namely, to build the dam with the 
greatest power output that can be constructed within the available budget. 
Because statements of objectives are frequently made in t h s  way, the terms cri- 
teria and objectives are often used interchangeably. 
To maximize a benefit such as power output from a project subject to a cost 
constraint (as above) or its equivalent, or to maximize the cost subject to a 
benefit constraint, is a commonly used criterion. It works well when the signifi- 
cant costs are monetary and there is a single dominant benefit. It is also used 
when the benefits are difficult to measure in monetary terms, say somethng 
like crime reduction or esthetic satisfaction. This orientation is called the cost- 
effectiveness criterion. Again it may be stated as an objective, for the decision- 
maker may say he wants to select the most cost-effective alternative. 
For public decisions, say for the choice of an airport location, a common 
criterion is that of cost-benefit analysis, that is, one chooses the location for 
which the net benefits exceed the net costs by the largest amount. A benefit 
may be interpreted as something that brings about a Pareto improvement-a 
change that makes at  least one member of the community better off and none 
worse off. A cost does the opposite. The measurement problems associated with 
cost-benefit analysis are enormous and are discussed later in section 8.5; for an 
explanation of the underlying principles of cost-benefit analysis, see Sugden and 
Williams ( 1978). 
Many other schemes have been used to combine various indicators into a 
single index, particularly when the impacts or conseqences are ones whose 
measurements indicate the worths of the alternatives. One type of index much 
used in the past is a quotient with the product of the measurements of impacts 
for which an increase is desirable in the numerator and with the products of the 
measurements of impacts for which a decrease is desirable in the denominator. 
Thus, to  compare alternative aircraft designs, if the significant indicators are V 
= speed, R = reliability, C = cost, P = payload, and F = fuel consumption, the 
index might be VRP/CF. To take account of the dffering importance of the fac- 
tors, exponents might be used. 
A far better form of index, if a single index of worth is to  be used, is one 
developed by utility analysis. This form of analysis permits the decisionmaker 
(or a group of decisionmakers) to determine both the "utility" or "satisfaction" 
that is associated with different values of an impact and the tradeoffs between 
the values of different impacts. The theory offers a theoretically sound way, 
through formal questioning, for an  analyst to help the decisionmaker to develop 
an index (Raiffa 1968; Keeney and Raiffa 1976). 
Criteria are tied to objectives; the criterion the analyst would like to  use is 
the one that ranks the alternatives in order of consistency with the 
decisionmaker's objectives. The decisionmaker may, and probably does, have 
objectives that he does not reveal to the analyst, possibly because he doesn't 
realize he has them until he is forced to make his decision. Hence, for t h s  rea- 
son and because the analysis itself is always imperfect in one way or another, 
the analyst should regard h s  rankings as guidance rather than a rule for choice. 
He may want to present rankings according to several criteria; to say to his 
client "If you regard X of overriding importance, then C is indicated; but if, as 
many people do, you regard Y of essentially equal importance, then B may be 
your choice." 
3. SATISFICING 
Since true optimization is impossible, satisficing, or replacing objectives by 
constraints, moves closer to  the world as it actually is. The reasons, as summar- 
ized by Simon (1969, p. 64), who supplied the name, are: "In the real world we 
usually do not have a choice between satisfactory and optimal solutions, for we 
only rarely have a method of finding the optimum. ... We cannot, within practica- 
ble computational limits, generate all the admissible alternatives and compare 
their relative merits. Nor can we recognize the best alternative, even if we are 
fortunate enough to generate it early, until we have seen all of them. We satis- 
!ice by looking for alternatives in such a way that we can generally find an 
acceptable one after only moderate search." 
To satisfice, lower bounds are set for the various goals that ,  if attained, are 
"good enough." An alternative is sought that will a t  least exceed these bounds. 
A unique solution is not sought and conflicts between goals do not have to be 
resolved. The satisficer does have to worry that the performance standards are 
not set too h g h ,  for then it may be impossible to satisfy the constraints. An 
alternative is usually considered to be good enough if it promises to do better 
than has been done previously. 
Satisficing is;in fact, far more common than the use of the term would indi- 
cate. Once a satisficing solution has been obtained, it may be possible to 
improve it. The applied systems analyst normally works under sharp time res- 
trictions. He may have just enough time to produce a solution that is "good 
enough" for the momentary situation, i.e., better than what is currently being 
done- and t h s  may be all that the decisionmaker really needs. 
4. SUBOPTIMIZATION 
The choice of criteria and objectives is made more difficult than otherwise 
when a decisionmaker, as he often must, undertakes to contribute (he hopes!) to 
the solution of a broad problem by finding a better way to handle the one aspect 
with which he is particularly concerned. Authority is everywhere divided; all 
decisions cannot be made at  the highest level, even when the authority to  do so 
exists. Thus, many problems are subproblems, parts of problems that for an 
"optimum" solution should be considered in the "big picture," but the decision- 
maker does not have the time or the authority to  do more than to  see to the 
improvement of his sector. Analysts, like decisionmakers, for these reasons as 
well as being forced by the difficulties of solving their problems, must frequently 
devote their attention to actions that pertain to only part of the problem. In the 
language of systems analysis, they "suboptimize." 
These attempts are suboptimizations because it is almost always possible to  
do better if all of the factors that could influence a solution can be considered 
simultaneously and the decisionmaker were able to make his selection from a 
larger net of alternatives. 
There are reasons to reject suboptimization, but as Hitch (1960a) corn- 
ments: 
It might appear then that it would make sense to begin  with some 
broad "given" or accepted objectives; to derive from them appropriate 
local or sub-objectives for the systems problem in hand; and then to 
design the analysis to maximize, in some sense, the proximate objec- 
tives ... 
Not only is this a plausible approach; it is in some special cases an 
acceptable one; it is usually (not always) better than making no sys- 
tems study a t  all; and it is frequently, given limitations on available 
time or manpower, the only feasible approach. I think I was the first to 
use the term "sub-optimization" to describe this style of operations 
research (in 1952), and I am no implacable or dogmatic foe of its use. 
Some of the most rewarding systems studies have in fact been low level 
sub-optimizations. [Italics in the original.] 
But as Hitch goes on to say, a suboptimization may not be satisfactory 
unless the criteria for the lower-level problem are consistent with those for the 
hlgher-level problem. Thus, to avoid inconsistencies, t he  analyst must give care- 
ful thought to the criteria and objectives for the full problem before deciding on 
the ones that should be used in the subproblem. An illustration may help 
(Quade 1975): 
For example, in the design of a car-parking operation for an 
amusement park, one size of lot and pricing system might be derived 
from a suboptimization in which the criterion is that of maximizing net 
revenues from parking and another size lot and pricing policy from an 
analysis that sought to maximize net revenues from the amusement 
park as  a whole. Lack of parking for a few people, who then go else- 
where, might lead to  considerable saving in land costs for parking and 
in salary for attendants, and thus in revenues for the lot, but the loss 
in goodwill, and thus in revenues for the park as a whole, might be seri- 
ous. 
A policy more consistent with the higher-level objective, and thus 
a better policy for the lot, might simply be to provide parking for all 
customers-or even to provide it free. We cannot know a priori, how- 
ever, that income from a parking lot should be small relative to the 
income for the facility it serves. Whenever there is little opportunity 
for visiting the facility except by private car, a significant general 
admission might be more acceptable if disguised as a parking fee. 
The advantage of suboptimization is that more detail can be taken into 
account in the narrower analysis. Models, because they involve fewer factors, 
may yield more accurate predictions. But the need for consistency between cri- 
teria for the full problem and those of the partial problem poses difficulties in 
selection. 
5. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE COST-BENEFIT CRITERION 
Decisionmaking is often described as a weighmg of benefits against costs if 
the benefits and costs are interpreted in the broad sense of referring to all 
kinds of advantages and disadvantages of different decision alternatives. Some- 
times risk is considered as a cost, sometimes as a separate dimension; however, 
it is a cost, since we are willing to pay to avoid it. Comparisons of various alter- 
natives in terms of benefit-cost-risk can therefore be considered a general 
framework of analysis (Dror 1975). Nevertheless, when the term cost-benefit 
analysis is used, it usually refers to a somewhat simplified type of analysis, well 
known to economists, and having its origin in welfare economics. 
In economic cost-benefit analysis the analyst identifies the different types 
of consequences of each alternative, usually a governmental project (e.g., the 
location of an airport or a power station). The consequences are estimated 
quantitatively and the quantities converted to monetary units. Monetary bene- 
fits and costs are then summed separately with proper attention to  probability 
and time of occurrence. The cost- benef i t  criterion means a ranking of the 
alternatives in decreasing order of the excess of benefits over costs. I t  should 
be borne in mind that  not all costs and benefits, even though expressed in the 
same monetary units, can necessarily be added in a straightforward way, 
without additional scaling: costs like benefits have to be treated initially as a 
multidimensional variable. 
Cost-benefit analysis has several attractive characteristics. The cost- 
benefit criterion seems relevant for decisionmaking and defines an  unequivocal 
method for ranking alternatives. Also, theoretically. it can be used to guide 
choice between such diverse alternatives as allocating funds for a water project 
(with irrigation, electric power, flood control, and recreation as goals) or for a 
health program to  reduce infant mortality. If the projects are roughly of the 
same scale, one prefers the project with the greater  excess of benefits over 
costs; if the projected benefits are less than the  costs, then the project should 
not be undertaken. 
Ideally, in a n  application, all consequences associated with implementing a n  
alternative for all future time should be identified, and then the probabilities of 
their occurrence and their benefit or cost to society determined. The expected 
loss or gain to society is calculated by multiplying each amount by the probabil- 
ity of occurrence. A discount rate is then assumed and the time streams of 
costs and benefits are  discounted and summed to  obtain their present values. 
The totality of benefits minus the totality of costs is then used t o  rank the alter- 
natives. The translation of consequences of implementation into monetary 
terms includes estimates by the analyst of the prices that  would have been 
attached to  various goods and services if a perfectly competitive market had 
existed. In principle, cost-benefit analysis can thus associate with each possible 
choice all the  inputs and outputs, all the positive and negative effects, including 
spillovers, with their probabilities and times of occurrence, condensing every- 
thing into a single number. However, a number of complications arise in con- 
nection with practical applications. 
In practice, to  quantify all types of effects and translate them into mone- 
tary terms may be very difficult and any method used will be open to  question. 
For instance, pollution effects can often not be considered as quite equivalent to 
some sum of money. Different decisionmakers may also have dfferent  time 
preferences, and these may not be conveniently expressed through the discount 
rate. Further, a general assumption behind the cost-benefit approach is that  
undesirable distributional effects can be corrected by transfer payments; costs 
and benefits, however, often accrue t o  different categories of people and satis- 
factory compensation to those who lose can often not be found. 
A s  a consequence of the complications mentioned above there are 
numerous objections to the use of a cost-benefit criterion. One is that  it is 
easily subject to abuse, since so many critical assumptions tend to be buried in 
the computation. The choice of a discount rate is particularly tricky. For 
instance, to promote a project with high installation costs but with the benefits 
deferred in time, advocates would argue for a low discount rate (two percent has 
been used for some water projects where the benefits were marginal and a long 
time in the future). Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the cost-benefit 
criterion is that it requires the analyst to make judgments (for instance in con- 
nection with distributional effects) which in fact are value judgments of the sort 
that should be left to the responsible decisionmaking body. 
Again, in theory, a considerable advantage of the cost-benefit criterion is 
that it permits comparisons of very different projects. But experience in appli- 
cations indicates that it is more likely to be used successfully when the decision 
alternatives are rather similar, i.e., with consequences similar in type and 
involving the same scale of effort. 
To give an illustration of the possibilities and limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis, we will use a hypothetical application. Assume that an additional air- 
port is considered to be required in a city area because of increasing air traffic. 
As the existing one cannot be extended, the problem is to find a suitable loca- 
tion for a second airport. To simplify, we assume further that there are several 
suitable and uninhabited land areas and that air traffic does not cause any nega- 
tive side effects, i.e., there are no noise or air pollution problems. To calculate 
the costs and benefits of the different locations, the analyst has.to estimate the 
impact on future air and surface travel, the monetary worth of savings in travel 
time, etc. These estimates may involve considerable uncertainties, but rough 
approximations are likely to be obtainable. Because of the uncertainties, it may 
not be possible t;o arrive at  a definite ranking order. Nevertheless, very bad 
alternatives can probably be revealed as such, and the analysis can help the 
decisionmakers to focus their further attention on a subset of the original alter- 
natives, a subset that is likely to contain only reasonably good alternatives. 
To make our hypothesized airport example somewhat more realistic, let us 
now assume that the alternative airport locations will, to a varying extent, bring 
noise disturbances into residential areas and also require that some residents, 
factories, etc.  be displaced. This means that there will be a group of people who 
probably cannot be compensated in a way they find quite satisfactory. Surely 
this information is important to the decisionmakers and should be brought to 
their attention; the cost-benefit criterion alone, in this case, is not the most 
suitable basis for ranking the alternatives and needs to  be supplemented in 
some way, say by a "scorecard" presentation, as described later. 
The term cost-benefit analysis is also used to describe studies whose results 
are not quite as condensed as a strict cost-benefit criterion requires. In such 
cost-benefit analysis, it is usually recommended that  benefits and costs that 
cannot be expressed in monetary units in a satisfactory way be displayed 
separately. When there are such effects more complex information has thus to 
be communicated from the analyst to the decisionmakers. For the analyst to 
choose when and how to do this, the information exchange between the analyst 
and the decisionmakers is of considerable importance. The analyst needs infor- 
mation about the decisionmaking situation and about what the decisionmakers 
consider important, and he has to structure the communication of his results in 
a way to fit the prevailing decision situation and in the language of the decision- 
maker. 
In evaluating risky projects with hghly adverse but rare consequences and 
negligible costs, a risk-benefit rather than a cost-benefit analysis is frequently 
used (Jennergren and Keeney 1979, Fischhoff 1977). The fundamental idea is to 
appraise whether or not the benefits outweigh the risks. It is used, for example, 
in deciding whether various food additives and drugs should be barred from the 
public . 
6. COST-EFFECI?YENESS ANALYSIS 
If we now turn back to our simplified airport example, it may happen that 
the study is being carried out a t  a time when the decision to  build a second air- 
port has already been taken. Perhaps several feasible and quite attractive alter- 
native locations have been found and general estimates or judgments have indi- 
cated that the benefits of a second airport will exceed the costs. In this case it 
may be an unnecessary complication to try to estimate the benefits in monetary 
terms, for some m e a s u r e  of effectiveness (e.g., some kind of air-travel capacity 
measure) may be of more interest. More generally, a project is usually under- 
taken to achieve some objective; the measure of effectiveness should indicate 
the extent to which the objective is achieved. 
Ths  leads us to a type of criterion of choice which can be termed cost- 
effectiveness. In t h s ,  alternatives are ranked either in terms of decreasing 
effectiveness for equal cost or in terms of increasing cost for equal effective- 
ness. Sometimes the maximum of the ratio of effectiveness to cost is used to 
indicate the preferred choice, but thls is open to all the objections that apply to 
the use of ratios for criteria (Hitch and McKean 1960) and will require additional 
information to fix the scale of the effort, as seen in Figure 8.1. Here, typical 
cost-effectiveness behavior is illustrated for two programs. Whether 1 is pre- 
ferred to 2 depends on the scale of the effort; if, for instance, the effectiveness 
must be at least E2, then 2 must be preferred (Attaway 1968). If, however, the 
cost cannot exceed C1, 1 is preferred. 
Cost-effectiveness is probably the most commonly used criterion for rank- 
ing alternatives. The reason is clear; it provides a comparison in terms of two 
factors of crucial importance to every decisionmaker-how much he will need to 
spend, and to what extent the action he takes will get him what he wants. It may 
be a sufficient basis for choice only in those rare instances when "other con- 
siderations" are not significant, but the information it provides is always helpful. 
The cost-effectiveness criterion is open to a number of 0bjection.s. One is 
that cost as used in cost-effectiveness reflects on.ly the costs that are  inputs- 
Cost 
Figure 8.1. Typical cost-effectiveness curves for two 
projects achieving the same maximum cost-effectiveness 
ratio. The dotted line is a line of constant cost-effec- 
tiveness, and the common maximum occurs where the 
curves are tangent to this line. 
the money, resources, time, and manpower required to implement and maintain 
an alternative. The penalties or losses that may accompany an  implemented 
alternative-it may, for instance, interfere with sometlung else that is wanted or 
bring undesirable consequences to other people-are costs that are not taken 
into account. 
Ordinarily, effectiveness does not measure value, but is merely a proxy for 
some aspect of it. A different choice of how we measure effectiveness can lead 
to a different preference among alternatives. For example, if the objective is to 
increase traffic safety and we choose as our measure of effectiveness the 
decrease in fatalities, we may then give high priority to reducing accidents 
where two cars collide a t  high speed, for these are very serious. But if our 
measure is the decrease in the economic cost of accidents, then priority may go 
to the avoidance of low-speed collisions in rush-hour traffic, for these are very 
numerous. 
Another defect is that the people who must pay the costs of a decision and 
those who stand to gain may not be the same. Unless the alternatives are so 
similar that tlus aspect can be neglected, a decision based on a cost- 
effectiveness criterion may mean trouble for the decisionmaker. Again, there is 
a likely clash of values. 
Finally, even if cost and effectiveness were fully and properly determined, 
the decisionmaker would still be faced with the problem of what to choose. He 
needs some way to set  the scale of effort-either the cost he must not exceed or 
the effectiveness level he needs to achieve. Sometimes this can be provided by 
setting the maximum cost so that it corresponds to the "knee" of the cost- 
effectiveness curve (Figure &I), since very little additional effectiveness is 
gained by further investment. 
It is clear that the type of cost-effectiveness criterion we have discussed 
here is often inadequate for decisionmaking problems for whch  multiple objec- 
tives, spillover effects, or the distributional aspects are important characteris- 
tics. 
7. DECISION ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis, as presented above, can be considered as a means of 
reconciling competing objectives through converting the various consequences 
into monetary units. The analysis is merely done for a higher-level objective-to 
find the course of action that brings the greatest excess of benefits over costs. 
As the benefits and costs associated with any proposal are quantified in mone- 
tary units, a system of weighting the various consequences of courses of action 
is, in effect, being used. 
Numerous other schemes for using a weighted combination of the conse- 
quences to provide a preference ranking of the alternatives have been tried. 
Some of these work satisfactorily when the decisions involved are of a repetitive 
type. Under the name of decision analysis a considerable body of knowledge has 
been developed which, in principle, is applicable both to one-time decisions and 
repetitive decisions. 
In the decision analysis approach, the analyst models the value system or 
preference structure of the decisionmakers so as to be able to predict with the 
model what the decisions would be, were the decisionmakers to be presented 
with the full set of alternatives and their consequences. To do this, the analyst 
constructs a function of the form V=f (zl,z 2,...,z,) representing the 
decisionmaker's value or utility rating of each alternative. Here the zils ,  
i = 1 , 2 ,  . . . n ,  are measures (on appropriate scales) of the consequences, proper- 
ties, aspects, or anything else associated with an alternative that the decision- 
maker would take into account in estimating the value of the alternative.' Thus, 
if competing designs for communication satellites were being ranked, z l  might 
be the initial investment cost, zz the expected mean time to failure, z3 the 
number of channels, and so on. The total number of factors that the decision- 
maker considers is n .  
'For a more detailed description of the paradigms of decision analysis, see chapter 1 in Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976). 
Any aggregate approach of this type, like the cost-benefit approach, has two 
serious disadvantages. One is that a great deal of information is lost by aggrega- 
tion; the fact that alternative A has environmental problems whereas alternative 
B has political implementation problems is suppressed. The second is that any 
single measure of value depends on the relative weights assigned by the  analyst 
and the assumptions he  used to  get them into commensurable units. 
To produce anything resembling a valid value function is clearly difficult, 
and may be impossible in many situations. There are problems both with get- 
ting the preference information from the decisionmakers and with putting it 
together in a usable expression.2 The first can require a substantial effort on the 
part of the decisionmakers. 
Many analysts believe that,  while such value functions are clearly useful for 
preliminary screening of alternatives, the final designation of a preferred alter- 
native must be made by other means. Particularly when the decision concerns 
the public sector, and the preferences depend on basic values, the decision thus 
being essentially a political decision, more disaggregated information needs to 
be communicated to the decisionmakers. Nevertheless, the analyst may, in the 
process of developing and using value functions, for his own initial inquiry, find 
that his understanding of the complexity of the problem, and consequently the 
advice that he finally offers, has been enhanced. 
8. AVOIDING THE CRITERION PROBLEM 
If someone is to help me decide whether somethng I think I would like to 
have is worth what I would have to give up to get it ,  the most informative way for 
h m  to do so is to present me with a full and honest description of what I would 
be getting, and getting into, including all negative aspects and side effects. I 
would judge this preferable to  being told that ,  because of previous decisions or 
statements, if I am to be consistent, I should do so and so. Many decisionmak- 
ers, ranging from individuals t o  the body politic, have this same feeling. 
eFor examination of the basic assumptions behmd decision analysis and the consequential prob- 
The obvious way of presenting such information is by means of a two- 
dimensional array or matrix. Until recently Bruce Goeller has been almost 
alone in advocating the use of such an  array as the replacement for ranking the 
alternatives by cost-benefit or other criteria in presenting the results of a sys- 
tems study to policymakers. On a scorecard, as Goeller (1972) calls such an 
array, the consequences that ensue from a possible decision to select each of 
the alternatives-the costs, benefits, spillovers, risks, segments of society 
affected, and in fact, anything about an alternative that the analyst thinks the 
decisionmaker might want to consider in his decision, including its characteris- 
tics and origins if that seems pertinent-are displayed (in terms of the natural 
units commonly used to characterize them) in a matrix, or tabular array. In 
such an array, the entries in each column represent the consequences associ- 
ated with a particular alternative and the entries in a row show how a particular 
consequence or other characteristic varies from alternative to alternative. [For 
examples in addition to the displays in Chapter 3. see Goeller 1977.1 Improve- 
ment by Goeller over the usual presentation lies in the careful selection of units 
for characterizing impacts, in grouping similar impacts into categories, and in 
using underlining, shading, or colors to show a crude ranking of alternatives 
(based on the analyst's interpretation of the decisionmaker's values, of course). 
The aim is to provide the decisionrnaker with a n  effective "gestalt" of the rela- 
tive advantages and disadvantages of particular alternatives. 
Consider noise impacts as an  example. These have usually been reported in 
terms of land area exposed to a noise level above some specified threshold. But 
the decisionrnaker is more interested in how noise affects people and in how 
many people. A scorecard can report the number of people exposed to various 
noise levels on a noise-annoyance scale. 
To illustrate the detail with whlch impacts can be presented, consider the 
group of "community impacts" reported in a transportation study (Goeller 
1972). These report changes in the activity patterns, tax base, and environment 
lems in applications, see Tribe (1972) and White and Bowen (1875). 
that would occur to the various communities in the region as the result of con- 
struction and operation of various alternative transportation systems. Specific 
impacts displayed in that  study include the number of households annoyed by 
excessive noise, the amount of air pollution, the savings in petroleum consump- 
tion, the households displaced by system construction, the amount of land 
taken, the resulting tax losses to the community, and even such an intangible as 
the loss of a community landmark. 
For oral presentation, color, in the form of transparent colored rectangles 
placed over the numerical values, can be used to give a quick indication of each 
alternative's ranking on a particular impact. Goeller used green to show the 
best value and red to show the worst, with two colors for intermediate values, 
blue for next best and orange for the next to worst. The numerical values them- 
selves were visible through the colors. Sensitivities to changes in  parameters or 
to different forecasts for the environment were shown by further transparent 
overlays and the use of multi-colored rectangles. 
The scorecard seems to be such a simple and obvious device that  no argu- 
ment for its use is needed. It is extremely flexible. A decisionmaker can see 
where an alternative he favors is deficient; he can ask what modifications would 
eliminate the unfavorable impacts from an otherwise promising alternative and 
whether this action might turn  some presently acceptable impact into an  unac- 
ceptable one. He can call for further analysis to show how changes in the 
assumptions originally made by the analyst will affect the results. Since the 
decislonmaker assigns h s  own weights to the different impacts, the  scorecard 
can help h m  understand the tradeoffs implied by the decision he  is to make. If 
he chooses A over B he may be trading off substantial increases in noise and 
future costs for savings in air pollution and initial investment costs. Such trade- 
offs are implicit in every decision, but the decisionmaker who views an aggre- 
gate index may not see them, for they have been obscured by the process that  
combined the different impacts into a si.ngle measure, even though he may have 
played a part  in agreeing to  t h s  process. The scorecard explicitly confronts the 
decisionmaker with the tradeoffs he must make. To decide, he must weight 
them subjectively, bringing to bear not only factual knowledge but his feeling for 
societal values. 
A scorecard presentation can also be understood, and used, by the public. 
Different groups can, in the same way as the ultimate decisionmakers, ask "what 
if" questions, apply their own weights, and confront the decisionmakers with 
their views based on much more information than if they had merely an  index to 
go on. 
The advantages of the scorecard over an aggregated index for providing gui- 
dance to decisionmakers may be summarized as follows: 
The scorecard 
seeks convergence to a decision-not agreement on value judgments from 
the decisionmaker or decisionmakers; 
is understandable and usable by decisionmakers and other groups 
involved, including the public a t  large; 
enables impacts and alternatives to  be evaluated with minimal interposi- 
tion of the analysts' biases and values; 
gives attention to qualitative as well as quantitative impacts; 
retains multidimensionality, showing tradeoffs explicitly; 
uses natural physical and thus understandable units. 
A disadvantage, for there is one, is that it may present too much informa- 
tion for a decisionmaker to  absorb. But this can be handled by careful selection 
of what to present, holding other information for later presentation when 
requested, bearing in mind that this process must be kept as free from the 
analyst's values as possible.' 
In their adaptive approach to environmental management, Holling and his 
colleagues rejected cost-benefit and similar criteria to use a scorecard 
JIt has been suggested that scorecards can be considered as a well linked transition from aearly 
quantitative methods to lexicographic ones. For a possible theoretical basis for this, see Roy (1977). 
approach, noting that ". . . the process of policy comparison through direct refer- 
ence to the individual indicators is the least ambiguous evaluation technique 
available. What it lacks in refinement is more than compensated for by the 
clear communication of relevant information" (Holling 1978, p. 110). 
For example, in their study of the interactions of a forest system with a 
pest called the budworm, they considered 17 impacts ( that  they called "indica- 
tors") grouped into three categories, as shown in Table 8.1. "Extensive experi- 
mentation with the system model and interviews with relevant decisionmakers 
identified five of the indicators listed . . . as primary;" they were (1) the forest 
volume, measured in cubic meters per hectare, (2) the harvest cost, measured 
in dollars per cubic meter ,  (3) unemployment, measured as a proportion of 
those normally employed in the forest-products industry, (4) recreational qual- 
ity, measured by an index lying between zero and one, and (5) insecticide appli- 
cations, measured by a proportion of a standard effort. However, we are  
interested, not only in values of these indicators, but also their history; there- 
fore, the scorecard technique for t h s  case requires displays of graphs of the 
indicator values over time, as shown in Figures 8.2-8.5. Holling (1978, pp. 110- 
112) summarizes the background of these figures as follows: 
. . . The values assumed by these indicators in a simulation of the  
management policy historically used in New Brunswick are given in Fig- 
ure [8.2]. In an at tempt to  improve t h s  policy, new spray and harvest 
rules were developed and then tested on the simulation. . . The results, 
presented in Figure [8.3], show improvement in some indicators, not- 
ably total forest volume, profits to the logging industry, and recrea- 
tion, but a somewhat worse situation with regard to  employment and 
insecticide spraying. . . 
A modification of the alternative policy was next designed, expli- 
citly tailored to decrease spraying by cutting down trees threatened by 
budworm. The results in Figure [8.4] show that  spraying is indeed 
reduced, but at  a cost of even more irregular employment due to the 
Table 8.1. Examples of i n d i c a t o r s  of known i n t e r e s t  t aken  
from t h e  f o r e s t - p e s t  (budworm) c a s e  s tudy .  Source: ~ o l l i n g  
(1978, p. 109 ) .  
Socioeconomic Indicarorr 
Profits to the logging industry 
Profits as a proportion of total sales 
Cost per unit volume of harvested wood 
Cost of insecticide spraying 
Unemployment rate reflected by the proportion of miU capacity utilized 
Resource Indicatorr 
Volume of wood in trees older than 20 years 
Volume of wood in trees older than 50 years 
Volume of wood harvested 
Proportion of total volume harvested 
Volume of wood killed by budworm 
Mill  capacity 
Total forest volume 
En vironmcn ral Indicarorr 
Visible damage due to  budworm defoliation 
Damage due to 10-g operations 
Age class diversity of the forest 
Number of high quality recreational areas 
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Figure 8.3. Values of the five forest-management indicators 
that would ensue from proposed new management rules involving 
new spray and harvesting policies. Source: Holling (1978). 
sporadic antibudworm harvest. The "good" forest volume, harvest cost, 
and recreational performance have been reasonably maintained, how- 
ever. Since any preventive harvest scheme seemed likely to incur this 
disadvantage, we searched elsewhere and attempted to reduce spray- 
ing by adding a hypothetical but realistic budworm virus to the model. 
As shown in Figure [8.5], this succeeded in reducing spraying substan- 
tially without radically increasing unemployment. Forest volume was 
better than with any other policy, and recreation was superior to any 
but the antibudworm harvesting policy. 
9. VALUE ANALYSIS AND POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 
Values and beliefs held by individuals and organizations affect analysis at all 
stages from problem formulation to decision and implementation. Differences 
in values can lead decisionmakers to advocate different actions on the basis of 
the same study, and, after a choice is made, can lead the implementing bureau- 
cracy to take actions the decisionmaker did not intend. 
In ranking the alternatives in preparation for a decision, or in helping the 
decisionmaker in ranking the alternatives, the analyst needs to discover a great 
deal about the decisionmaker's values. This is not easily done; "we can always 
ask people about their values, but in the end, we can only infer what values they 
appear to hold by analyzing their behavior, including their statements, in a 
number of situations." (Bowen 1979). Other approaches are possible. Bowen 
(1979) suggests such topics as the following merit more attention than they have 
been given: analysis of options, hypergame theory, structural mapping, per- 
sonal construct theory, fuzzy sets, and a number of ideas stemming from con- 
flict research and research gaming. 
I t  is sometimes argued that decision problems that are "political" or value 
sensitive cannot be subjected to analysis. According to another view, values and 
facts are distinguishable and analysts (or experts, scientists, etc.) should cont.ri- 
bute only facts to the decisionmaking process. There are also arguments for a 
direct involvement of analysts in "value analysis ," which includes improving the 
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Figure 8.5. Values of the five forest-management indicators 
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modified by introducing an antibudworm virus. Source: 
Holling (1978) . 
value judgment of "legitimate value judges" without usurping that function. To 
quote Dror (1975): 
. . . this is achieved through methodologies designed to structure the 
judgment field and to explicate value dimensions in a way that permits 
more conscious, comprehensive and explicit judgment by the legiti- 
mate value judges. These processes help them to make more 'respon- 
sible' value judgments on the basis of clarification of the fullest mean- 
ings of the involved values. Primary methods of value analysis include 
testing of value sensitivity, examination of value consistency, checking 
the completeness of the value set, explication of tacit value dimensions 
(e.g., time preferences and lottery preferences), value mapping, con- 
sideration of value futures, design of value and goal taxonomies, and 
more. 
The feasibility of implementation is an important aspect when decision 
alternatives are compared. Depending on the decisionmaking process some 
alternatives may not be implementable if there are  certain groups who object to 
them. The analysis of such aspects is sometimes called "political feasibility" 
testing (Dror 1968). It involves investigating the probability that a proposed 
action will be acceptable to  various secondary decisionmakers-the special 
interest groups, the public, and the bureaucracy who must translate i t  into 
action. If the probability is too low, compromises can be made to increase 
acceptability. Analysis can help find the preferable .compromises-those that 
increase acceptability without a proportionate loss in attainment of policy goals. 
Cost-benefit and similar anal.yses designed to  produce an  economic ally effi- 
cient solution may encounter political opposition. For an alternative to bepolit- 
ically feasible, it may not only have to approximate the largest total benefit 
available to the affected parties as a whole, but, in addition, allocate the aggre- 
gate benefits and costs among the various interest groups in a way that reflects 
their political strengths. Thus, the alternative selected .must be acceptable to 
the most influential interest groups and not too strongly opposed by the others. 
When a group is asked to accept an alternative in a situation where a competing 
alternative would bring them greater benefit, then, if the losses can be 
estimated, the chosen alternative frequently can be made acceptable (and thus 
politically feasible), by arranging a payoff to the objecting group, say, by tax 
exemptions or deductions designed to benefit them specifically (Olson 1971, 
Starling 1979). 
10. UNCERTAINTIES 
In previous sections we have mentioned the existence of uncertainties, but 
not sufficiently emphasized their dominant role and pervasiveness in systems 
analysis and decisionmaking. To evaluate decision alternatives we must esti- 
mate the future consequences of various courses of action, and the future is 
always uncertain. The effects of some uncertainties-say those in economic, 
technical, and operational parameters that can be identified, measured, or at  
least estimated, and treated statistical.1~-can often be taken account of in the 
analysis proper by actual calculation of the probabilities, or by Monte Carlo 
methods, or, less precisely, by using means or expected values. Sensitivity test- 
ing and a fortiori analysis can also be done and presented to the decisionmaker. 
Other uncertainties, about future environments and contingencies, and about 
certain activities that depend on the actions of people (now as well as in the 
future), are more intractable. 
The decisionmaker is always confronted with a certain amount of uncer- 
tainty when presented with the results of a systems analysis. When the issu.e has 
long-term implications or involves a rapidly changing situation or one being 
manipulated by other decisionmakers, a number of different forecasts of the 
state of the world or scenarios may have to be considered. In this case, the 
results of the analysis as carried out for each contingency or forecast may not 
indicate the same order of preference among the alternatives. What then can 
the analyst suggest to the decisionmaker if, under one contingency with. high 
probability of occurrence, alternative A is clearly superior, but, under another 
contingency of low probability but with catastrophic implications, alternative B 
IA  hatter? 
Faced with such uncertainty the decisionmaker can, depending on the cir- 
cumstances, take one or more of the following actions: 
1) Delay: that is, defer h s  action until better information is available. 
Delay, of course, is not always an option and, when it is, it may be costly, partic- 
ularly when competition or conflict is involved. 
2) Buy information: attempt to alleviate uncertainty by supporting 
further research and data collection. Ths also involves delay and cost and may 
or may not improve the situation. 
3) Hedge: adopt duplicate alternatives or modify an alternative to intro- 
duce greater flexibility-at a hgher  cost, of course. 
4) Compromise: select an alternative that, whle it may not be best for 
the contingency judged to be most likely, does not rank too low on the less likely 
ones. 
5) Be conservative: choose the alternative that gives the best result if 
the environment is maximally unkind. Thls is the "maximin" approach, in which 
one resolves uncertainties by making the blanket assumption that the worst will 
happen. 
6) Use decision theory: argue that the probabilities of the various states 
of nature are not completely unknown and beyond human judgment, assign pro- 
babilities to them subjectively, and then use an approach that would be 
appropriate for the cas% in which the probabilities are known. 
The U S  military (whch may have had as long a n  experience with systems 
analysis under conditions of uncertainty as any other institution) had at  one 
time something like the following phlosophy. Any attempt to determine a 
unique best solution to a problem involving a large number of uncertain factors, 
some of which may be under the influence of other d.ecisionmakers, is doomed 
to failure. The aim instead should be to search out or design alternatives that 
perform well or  even close to the best for  what appear to be the most likely set 
of contingencies and from such alternatives, whenever i t  can be done, select the 
one that gives some sort of reasonably satisfactory performance under the more 
unlikely and even pessimistic circumstances. 
1 1. RISK EVALUATION 
Side effects, or negative impacts that are not direct costs to be borne by 
the de~ i s i o n ma k e r ,~  may sometimes need special attention both when designing 
and when comparing the alternatives. Side effects are  sometimes treated by 
imposing constraints. However, the elimination, or the reduction in the proba- 
bility, of the occurrence of serious negative side effects must often be made an 
objective. Reductions that  are  below some low probability limit usually have a 
value. 
The term risk is often used in connection with uncertain negative side- 
effectse5 More specifically, risk is often associated with highly negative conse- 
quences, occurring rarely. The exact meaning of risk varies somewhat. Some- 
times it means the probability of a negative consequence. In other cases it may 
mean the negative consequences themselves. In yet other cases, it may refer to 
the statistical expectation of the negative consequences. Most commonly, how- 
ever, risk refers to the entire spectrum of negative consequences with their 
associated probabi.lities (see Jennergren and Keeney 1979). 
Risk assessment is often thought of as consisting of two parts: risk estima- 
tion and risk evaluation. In risk estimation, one is concerned with identifying 
the various serious negative consequences of a project or activity, and assigning 
probabilities (or rates of occurrence) to  those consequences. In risk evaluation, 
one appraises the acceptability of the risk to society. 
4Such negative impacts a re  costs to the decisionmaker in the  sense tha t  they prevent successful 
implementation or otherwise frustrate his decision. 
5h ecoriornic and decision-thcoretic literature, risk is sometimes used with a different meaning, 
denoting a nondeterministic situation where the probabjlities of various events are  known (see Jen- 
nergren and Keeney 1979.) 
A risk evaluation sometimes includes comparisons with other risks that 
exist in society. This does not mean that such comparisons necessarily lead to 
definite conclusions. The acceptability of a risk depends on whether it is con- 
sidered as a voluntary or an involuntary one, and also on the magnitude of the 
associated benefits. Also, the character of the risk is of importance. When two 
projects have risks with the same expected value (and the same benefits) people 
are not necessarily indifferent to them. If the worst that can happen is less seri- 
ous in project A than in project B, many people will prefer A. Consequently, risk 
evaluation may depend on value preferences, in which case the analyst must 
leave the final evaluation to "the legitimate value judges." 
12. DECISION PROCESSES. PLANNING, AND POLICIES 
In the previous parts of this chapter, we have assumed that the guidance to 
be given to the  decisionmakers concerns the choice between a number of alter- 
native s that have been evaluated in the analysis. Actually, the decisionrnakers 
may make other types of decisions. If the alternatives studied have been dif- 
ferent designs of a public project, the  first decision to be taken may not be a 
final decision in favor of one of the alternatives but may, for instance, be a deci- 
sion: 
to study some of the designs in more detail, perhaps with new con- 
straints; 
to accept a part of a design and keep the option open to choose later 
on among several alternatives; 
to include one design, perhaps vaguely described, in a plan that is to 
be reconsidered or reviewed later on. Certain options are thus left open regard- 
mg the final version of the project; 
to  make further studies. 
The decision processes that  follow a systems analysis may take many dif- 
ferent forms, and the form to be chosen may be difficult to predict. However, 
some information about the likely decisionmaking process is usually available to 
the analysts and this type of information can be important to take into account 
both in the design and the evaluation phases of a study. Much research has also 
been devoted to decision processes (Allison 1971, Simon 1957, Keen 1977, Cyert 
and March 1963, Lindblom 1959). Results from such descriptive-explanatory 
research is, of course, of considerable importance to the applied systems 
analyst. 
It should be mentioned that  a systems study does not always involve rank- 
ing followed by choice from among a number of alternatives. Sometimes, when 
the start  of the study is a vaguely defined problem area, the output consists of 
no more than some tentatively defined decision alternatives or some guidelines 
for developing such alternatives. In the US, many systems studies are carried 
out in the form of "program evaluations." Here the study starts  after the deci- 
sion to launch a new program has been implemented and the program has been 
under way for some time. The problem defined a t  the outset may be "Has it 
worked as  expected?" The result of the study is usually that  i t  has not, but, 
more importan.tly, the study may suggest where to look for possible improve- 
ments (Hatry 1.980). One should not expect the need for analysis to  stop with 
implementation. Policy decisions even supported by the best of analysis seldom 
result in a program needing only enforcement for implementation. Models are 
imperfect and circumstances change. As part of the analytic effort, i t  should be 
determined as soon as possible whether the results are as anticipated, and if 
not, how to modify accordingly the process discovered. This monitoring and 
evaluating function could, and perh.aps should, be undertaken by someone other 
than the original analyst or policymaker (Walker 1978). 
13. GUIDANCE FROM TtLE ANALYbT 
The effectiveness of these various schemes for presenting the results of 
analysis, and for carrying out the analysis itself, depends to an extent on the 
decisionmaking situation. It is best when this situation approximates the 
rational actor model. However, a knowledge of which other model-the process- 
oriented view (Simon 1945), the organization-process view (Cyert and March 
1963, Allison, 1971), the political paradigm (Lindblom 1959, Allison 1971), or the 
apprehensive man (Keen 1977)- best approximates the decionmaking situation 
is useful to the analyst, not so much in finding a "best" solution, but in finding a 
way to get that "best" solution accepted or adopted and implemented by the 
relevant decisionmakers and organizations other than his client. Adoption of a 
proposal is, in fact, usually easier to achieve than successful implementation. A t  
the decision stage, participants may not feel it necessary to resolve uncertain- 
ties, for they can be taken care of during implementation. All that is needed 
may be enough support to tip the decisionmaking body in favor of the proposal. 
This support can be verbal and soft; implementation, however, demands that the 
organizations involved contribute real resources and here is where the crunch 
may come. But, as Majone (1980) argues, technologically sound information and 
factual arguments are not always enough to win acceptance. A well written 
report, a carefully prepared visual presentation (briefing), and persuasive com- 
munication may be needed to  change the then current attitudes. 
The type of guidance for decision that the analyst can give as a result of a 
systems analysis may be in the form of clearly specified recommendations, e.g., 
in favor of a given decision alternative. Whether this is a satisfactory action 
depends on many issues, for example, 
Have the criteria for the recommendations been thoroughly explored 
and agreed upon? 
Are these criteria expressible in a quantifiable manner? 
Has this quantification been based on value judgments with which the 
decisionmaker is in full agreement? 
Are the models used fully satisfactory to the analyst? 
Are the situations tested by the models, and the alternative options 
explored in these situations, reasonably complete and unquestionable? 
Are there agreed ways of weighing multiple criteria and multiple 
objectives? 
Apprehension is sometimes said to dominate analysis (Keen 1977). 
Decisionmakers may sometimes learn through apprehension rather than 
comprehension and rely on experience rather than on understanding and ana- 
lytic methods. 
It is often possible for decisionmakers to agree on the action to be taken, 
even though they disagree on objectives. A policymaker may concur in the deci- 
sion to accept a study recommendation for reasons far different from those the 
analyst had in mind. He may do so, for instance, because by so doing he may 
forestall stronger action or because he may see how to divert money that will be 
appropriated to implement the recommendation to other purposes. 
It is not surprising then that, in general, it is safer and more satisfactory 
merely to provide pros and cons of better options in many situations. In dialo- 
gue with the decisionmakers, there is a wide-ranging exploration and attempt to 
make less vague both the nature of the problem itself and the values that the 
various possible options for decision have for the decisionmaker. Most systems 
analysts have ways of doing this, although there seems to be no general metho- 
dology: there are different approaches depending on the values held by analysts 
and decisionmakers and the way in which they interact. 
The aim of systems analysis, while it is to improve decisionmaking, is also to 
make the decisionmaker more satisfied that the basis lor his decision is ade- 
quate and informed. The study done must provide new insights into the problem 
area under discussion, and it must be structured and presented in a way that 
facilitates h s  use of the information it contains. The analysis must be seen to 
be relevant and its communication must be readily understood. The mode of 
communication, continuous or at  intervals, orally or in writing, diagrammatic or 
in words, technical or nontechnical, mathematical or nonmathernatical, will vary 
with circumstances, but it must be in terms familiar to the decisionmaker. Spe- 
cial communication aids include interactive computer modeling, scenario 
writing, games and game-theoretic processes, films, and even forms of counsel- 
ling. 
The important issue is how decisionmakers interpret the data put before 
them, because only some of this will be seen by them as information relevant to 
their decisions (for some of the pitfalls, see Lynn 1980). Their previous experi- 
ence, their general world view, their reaction to variables and constraints that 
the analyst has or has not been able to take fully into account, and particularly 
their attitude towards analysis and their prior beliefs, will all affect how they use 
what they are offered. Analysts should strive always to understand the total 
environment of decisionmaking so as to provide the maximum of information 
and the minimum of redundant data, although initial redundancies have a habit 
of being useful if the decisionmaker chooses to delay his decision in one way or 
another. 
The fact, mentioned above, that no general methodology exists for the final 
stage of analysis and decision, leaves one important thing still to be said. Any 
analyst who can make explicit, for a stated systems analysis, how the communi- 
cation process used was conceived and what its successes and failures were, will 
have added something of value to the literature on the subject. The trouble is 
that, because the process depends so much on personal values and understand- 
ing of values, it is difficult to  write anything down in a way that can be inter- 
preted and used by others. It i.s, nevertheless, worth trying. 
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